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only a preference had been granted as to intestate property. 4
The act now provides that no veteran's award, regardless of
size, shall be subjected to costs taxed or charged by public of-
ficers. 95 Probate courts may now determine claims of title by
adverse parties, but the latter may have a jury trial if they so
desire.96 It is also now permissible to carry life insurance on a
ward or on some person in whose life the ward has an insurable
interest, the cost of such insurance being charged to the ward's
estate as a form of investment.9
VII. PUBLIC LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A question may arise, when an administrative tribunal makes
a finding of fact of the type frequently required of it by statute,
as to whether or not such finding should follow the exact word-
ing of the statute so as to provide clear support for the accom-
panying order. That question was answered, in Missouri Pa-
cific Railway Company v. Illinois Commerce Commission,' where
the commission, acting under the Public Utilities Act, sought to
require the carrier to maintain rear-end flag protection for two
of its passenger trains. The specific provision of the statute
authorized the commission to require the performance, by any
railroad, of "any other act which the health or safety of its em-
ployes, customers, or the public may demand. '2  The commis-
sion found, in substance, that public safety required the rear-
end flag protection but nowhere, in its findings, did it make spe-
cific reference to the public "demand" for such protection. The
carrier argued that the findings of the commission were defec-
tive for failure to correspond with statutory requirements, but
the court held that it was not necessary to utilize statutory ter-
minology so long as other synonymous terms were used.
94 Laws 1949, p. 9, S. B. 112; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 232.
95 Laws 1949, p. 5, S. B. 79; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, §§ 270a and 298a.
96 Laws 1949, p. 4, S. B. 113; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 339a.
97 Laws 1949, p. 6, S. B. 260; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 413.
1401 Ill. 241, 81 N. E. (2d) 871 (1948).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 1112/, § 61.
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Some confusion about the procedure to be followed by one
seeking judicial review under the new Illinois Administrative
Review Act 3 has been generated by the Illinois Supreme Court,
through the medium of its decision in Krachock v. Department of
Revemie,4 although upon a point which was not necessary to the
final determination of that case. The plaintiff had held a dis-
tributor's license under the Motor Fuel Tax Act 5 but, being no-
tified by the department that he was indebted to the state for
money due under the statute, he voluntarily surrendered his
license. No further action was taken against him to recover
the money claimed to be due. Four years later, plaintiff applied
for a similar license only to have his application rejected on the
statutory ground that he was indebted to the state.6 A complaint
filed under the Administrative Review Act projected a major
legal question over the absence in the administrative record of
that portion thereof which dealt with the determination of plain-
tiff's indebtedness to the state. As the whole controversy hinged
thereon, it was impossible for the court to review the action
of the administrative tribunal.7 To that point, the decision was
in full harmony with the statute.
In the final paragraph of the opinion, however, the court
took exception to the fact that the plaintiff, in bringing the ac-
tion, had made the Department of Revenue a defendant. It was
said that this was tantamount to bringing a suit against the state,
a step prohibited by the state constitution.8  If such is the case,
then an unfortunate state of affairs has been created. The very
purpose of action under the Administrative Review Act is to
bring before the reviewing court the record of the administra-
tive proceedings. As that record is to be found in the custody
3 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 265 et seq.
4 403 Ill. 148, 85 N. E. (2d) 682 (1949).
5 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 120, § 417 et seq.
6 Ibid., Ch. 120, § 419.
7 It should be remembered that judicial review is limited to the record and no
new evidence may be submitted: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 274. It is
impossible to determine from the opinion why the important portion of the record
was not before the court. The fault would seem to rest on the plaintiff for it is up
to him to specify, in his complaint, the record or portion thereof he wishes to be
submitted to judicial review: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 272(a).
8 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. IV, § 26.
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of the department making the initial determination, it has been
the custom in the past, when utilizing the writ of certiorari, to
designate the particular department as defendant.9  It is dif-
ficult to understand why the same practice is not to be tolerated
in cases coming under the Administrative Review Act, particu-
larly as the court furnishes no inkling as to who should be named
as defendant in the action. Since the only purpose of such a
proceeding is to open the administrative record to judicial re-
view, the typical elements of a suit against the state, in which
potential state liability may be involved, are clearly lacking.
Review under the statute just mentioned is available only
in those cases where the provisions of that statute are assimi-
lated in the act creating or conferring power on the administra-
tive agency. 10 The legislature has, from time to time, amended
many of the agency statutes so as to permit use of the simpler
modern form of judicial investigation into administrative rulings.
That trend was accelerated, during the recent General Assembly,
when some forty-four assimilative provisions were added to exist-
ing agency statutes." Not a few of these authorize direct appeal
from trial court to the state supreme court, thereby circumvent-




The nature of the treatment to be accorded by Illinois courts
to foreign divorce decrees has been made the subject of com-
ment elsewhere in this survey 13 and further discussion thereof
would be superfluous. Only one other case involving aspects of
conflict of laws, therefore, remains to be noticed. It appeared
from the facts in First National Bank of Nevada v. Swegler'4
9No objection of the kind here noted was voiced in Snite v. Department of
Revenue, 398 Ill. 41, 74 N. E. (2d) 877 (1947).
10 111. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 265.
11 Most of the amendments originated in the lower house, but the list is too long
to reproduce at this point. The amendments range from the licensing of architects,
under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 10 , § 13f, to zoning matters, under Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 34, § 152k.
12 1ll. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 278.
13 See section on Family Law, ante.
14 336 Ill. App. 107, 82 N. E. (2d) 920 (1948). Leave to appeal denied.
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that a chattel mortgage on an automobile had been duly exe-
cuted according to the laws of Nevada and a certificate of reg-
istration had been issued there indicating that the mortgagee
was the registered owner of the car. Contrary to a provision
in the mortgage forbidding removal of the property from the
state without written consent, the mortgagor took the automo-
bile into Wyoming and there, through fraud, obtained a certifi-
cate of title from that state. The second certificate, of course,
failed to disclose the presence of any lien on the vehicle. The
mortgagor, armed with the Wyoming certificate, then brought
the car to Illinois and sold it to an Illinois dealer who, in turn,
transferred the same to the defendant, a bona-fide purchaser. In
an action brought in Illinois by the mortgagee to enforce the
chattel mortgage, the trial court decided for the defendant, but
the Appellate Court, following an earlier decision, 15 reversed on
the ground that a mortgage, executed in another state in accord-
ance with the laws thereof, is to be given the same force and
effect in Illinois as it possesses at the place of execution. The
common notion that an automobile certificate of title is a credible
document, in reliance upon which legal rights may be erected,
has again been demonstrated to be as unsound as are most other
commonly accepted notions.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Issues of constitutional law not already noted 16 became the
subject of consideration in several cases. Thus the right of the
Illinois Progressive Party to secure a place on the ballot for its
candidates was involved in McDougall v. Green.17 The election
statute in controversy therein required that a petition to form
a new political party and to obtain a place on the state ballot
for its nominees had to be signed by a substantial number of
15 National Bond & Investment Co. v. Larsh, 262 Ill. App. 363 (1931).
16 See section on Criminal Law and Procedure, ante, for comment on the holding
of the United States Supreme Court in Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U. S. 1,
69 S. Ct. 894, 93 L. Ed. 1131 (1949).
17 335 U. S. 281, 69 S. Ct. 1, 93 L. Ed. 3 (1948). Justice Rutledge wrote a separate
concurring opinion. A dissenting opinion by Justice Douglas was concurred in by
Justices Black and Murphy.
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qualified voters but also required that, in the aggregate total, it
was necessary to include the signatures of at least two hundred
voters from each of at least fifty counties within the state.18 The
Progressive Party's petition had been rejected on the ground
that signatures had not been obtained in each of the required
number of counties. An injunction had been sought to prevent
the state officials from enforcing the statute on the basis that
it was unconstitutional because, in the main, it was so discrim-
inatory as to produce the disenfranchisement of a considerable
number of the citizenry. It was claimed that, due to the peculiar
distribution of the population among the one hundred and two
counties of the state, it would be impossible for a party whose
support was to be found in only a few counties, even though they
were large in population, to obtain a place on the ballot. 19 The
federal district court refused to grant the injunction 20 and, upon
appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed in a split de-
cision. 21 The position of the majority of that court is best sum-
marized in the following quotation:
It would be strange indeed, and doctrinaire, for this court,
applying such broad constitutional concepts as due process
and equal protection of the laws, to deny a state the power
to assure a proper diffusion of political initiative as between
its thinly populated counties and those having concentrated
masses, in view of the fact that the latter have practical
opportunities for exerting their political weight at the polls
not available to the former.
22
State cases also forced examination into the constitutionality
of certain of the legislative enactments. The validity of the 1943
amendment to the Cigarette Tax Act was brought into focus,
18 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 46, § 10--2.
19 The complaint alleged that 52% of the registered voters were residents of Cook
County; that 87% were residents of the forty-nine most populous counties; and that
only 13% resided in the fifty-three least populous counties of the state.
2080 F. Supp. 725 (1948).
21 A concurring opinion by Justice Rutledge was predicated on the fact that the
issue had, in a practical sense, become virtually moot as the date for the election
was too close to the date of the decision to permit the making of proper arrange-
ments. The dissenters believed the distribution of population in Illinois was such
as to render the statutory provision discriminatory.
22 335 U. S. 281 at 284, 69 S. Ct. 1, 93 L. Ed. 3 at 7.
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for example, in two cases. 23 The plaintiffs there concerned had
purchased cigarettes by mail order from Indiana dealers for
their own use and not for the purpose of resale. When the state
attempted to collect a cigarette tax, the plaintiffs sought injunc-
tive relief on the basis that the statute, as amended, was in-
valid. The original statute had been described, by its title, as
one designed to impose a tax upon persons "engaged in the busi-
ness of selling cigarettes," so clearly was intended to apply
to distributors, that term being used in its generally accepted
commercial sense. By the 1943 amendment, the term "distribu-
tors" was defined to include any "person who in any one calen-
dar year brings or causes to be brought into this state for con-
sumption more than ten (10) cartons of original packages of
cigarettes." ' 24  The Illinois Supreme Court, affirming a lower
court decision granting an injunction, held that to make such
acts alone the criterion of engaging in the business of distribut-
ing cigarettes was so obviously designed to include persons who
could not be in such business as to render the classification ob-
noxious, in addition to which the scope of the amendment was
not within the subject matter expressed by the title of the orig-
inal statute.25 Further evidence of unconstitutionality was found
in the fact that the amendment imposed an improper tax upon
interstate commerce. Clear interference with that commerce
would be present if a state were to be permitted to impose a tax
upon sales consummated elsewhere. Since the transactions con-
cerned in the instant cases consisted of accepting orders sent from
the jurisdiction attempting to tax, the unsoundness of the amend-
ment was evident.
A provision of the Cities and Villages Act, one providing for
judicial review of the decisions of a board of zoning appeals,
was questioned in Illinois Bell Telephone Company v. Fox.26 It
appeared therein that the utility had been denied a building
permit for the construction of a telephone exchange building. The
23 Babcock v. Elliott, 403 Ill. 329, 86 N. E. (2d) 354 (1949) ; Johnson v. Daley,
403 Ill. 338, 86 N. E. (2d) 350 (1939).
24 Laws 1943, p. 1063, S. B. 436; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 120, § 453.1 (3).
25 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. IV, § 13.
26402 Ill. 617, 85 N. E. (2d) 43 (1939).
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board of zoning appeals had affirmed the building commissioner's
decision but, on review in the circuit court, the decision of the
board had been set aside. That judgment was affirmed on cer-
tiorari to the state supreme court. It was urged on the upper
court that the applicable section of the statute allowing judicial
review was unconstitutional, by reason of a violation of the doc-
trine concerning the separation of powers, 27 in that the statute
permitted the court, if it found additional testimony was neces-
sary for a proper disposition of the matter, to take such evi-
dence and then to reverse or affirm the decision, in whole or in
a part, or to modify the same. 28 It was argued that, by confer-
ring upon the court the power to hear new evidence and to modify
the board's decision, the statute purported to authorize the ju-
dicial tribunal to exercise a discretion which had been committed
to the administrative body. The Supreme Court said it recog-
nized the fact that the separation of powers doctrine would serve
to prevent a court, when reviewing an administrative decision,
from substituting its discretion for that of the administrative
body. It held, however, that such was not the result produced
by the statute in question for it considered that the court, when
acting under the provision, would only pass on the legality of
the administrative decision. The board would appear to have
the better of the argument, though, for the power to hear new
evidence plus the authority to modify the decision has been said
to give a court an opportunity to exercise the discretionary func-
tion previously committed to the administrative board.29
It was to be expected that the state supreme court would
fall into line with the holding of the federal supreme court in
the case of Shelley v. Kraemer,"° a case concerning restrictive
covenants, whenever the opportunity was presented. The chance
came when the Illinois court passed on the appeal taken in
Tovey v. LevyA1 Injunction had there been granted by the trial
27 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. III.
28 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 24, § 73-6.
29 That, at least, was the basis for the decision in Federal Radio Commission v.
General Electric Co., 281 U. S. 464, 50 S. Ct. 389, 74 L. Ed. 969 (1930).
30334 U. S. 1, 69 S. Ct. 836, 92 L. Ed. 1161 (1948).
31401 Ill. 393, 82 N. E. (2d) 441 (1948), noted in 27 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
178 and 37 Ill. B. J. 312.
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court, in accordance with previous cases on the point, to prevent
the violation of a racially restrictive covenant which had been
created by the mutual agreement of a number of Illinois property
owners. The injunction was ordered set aside, on the authority
of the holding in the federal case, not because the agreement was
void for opposition to public policy but because enforcement by
judicial means amounted to improper state action of the type con-
demned by the Fourteenth Amendment.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
Advocates of home rule, seeking a degree of independence
for municipalities in order that they might meet purely local
problems, will find little solace in the decision of the Supreme
Court in Higgins v. City of Galesburg.32  In that case, an ordi-
nance by which the city had sought to require producers of milk
to obtain a license and submit to inspection was held invalid as
an attempt to exercise extra-territorial powers which had not
been conferred upon the city by the legislature. Statutory au-
thority to impose such measures on dairy farms located within
one-half mile of the city limits does exist, 33 but the ordinance in
question attempted to prohibit the sale of milk produced more
than ten miles from the city limits with corresponding licensing
for producers with the ten-mile area. The plaintiff, a milk
processor in Peoria, had been denied a license by the defendant,
but won his case on the ground indicated, a holding in line
with other Illinois decisions which have regularly denied to mu-
nicipalities all powers except those plainly spelled out by the
legislature.3
4
Another license case, that of Sager v. City of Silvis, 35 serves
to clarify the authority possessed by municipalities to license
32 401 111. 87, 81 N. E. (2d) 520 (1948).
33 Il. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 24, § 8-1. See also, Ch. 24, §§ 23-63, 23-64,
23-S1, and 23-105.
34 The denial of the right to so regulate has been said to be against the great
weight of authority in other states and is said to be opposed to the practical neces-
sities of this field of regulation: 1948 Ann. Surv. Am. Law 256. See also colument
in 44 Ill. L. Rev. 241.
35402 Ill. 262, 83 N. E. (2d) 683 (1949).
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the sale of liquor. The ordinance there concerned required the
payment of a license fee of $1000 per year. The petitioner sought
to restrain its enforcement on the ground that the fee charged
bore no reasonable relation to the cost of regulation. The stat-
ute which granted to municipalities the right to license was obvi-
ously designed to serve regulatory purposes, 36 but the court held
that an incidental obtaining of revenue was not prohibited. The
rule which generally requires that licensing fees be proportion-
ate to the cost of regulation was held not to apply to activities
of a type long recognized to be harmful and productive of dis-
order, such as the traffic in liquor, but was to be confined to the
licensing of businesses of a more innocuous nature.
The argument that the fees charged bore no relation to the
cost of regulation was also asserted in MacNeil v. Chicago Park
District, 7 but again the contention failed, albeit for a different
reason. The court there concerned first held that the power
delegated to a park district to establish and maintain rules and
regulations for the use of lagoons and harbors by the public
necessarily carried with it the power to require payment of a
reasonable fee for the use of the special facilities. It went on,
however, and pointed out that, where the performance of official
duty involved the exercise of judgment or discretion, the officer's
determination as to his course of action was not subject to re-
view or control. Despite this, the court did examine into the
schedule of fees and found the charges to be of reasonable
character.
Three cases concerned the validity of acts designed to es-
tablish municipal corporations. Through a long and cumbersome
opinion in People v. Deatherage,38 the Supreme Court disposed
of a barrage of constitutional objections directed against the
Community Unit School District Act.39 It held there was no dep-
rivation of the right of the people to a thorough and efficient sys-
36 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 43, § 4-1.
37 401 Ill. 556, 82 N. E. (2d) 452 (1948).
38401 Ill. 25, 81 N. E. (2d) 581 (1948).
39 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 122, § 8-9 et seq.
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tem of free schools, 40 nor did the "fractionating" of a former
school district constitute a taking without due process. 41 Voters
residing in the territory of an existing district were said not
to be deprived of their right to vote when they were taken into
a new community unit school district.42 Claims of unlawful dele-
gation of legislative power and of inadequate labeling were also
rejected. The case should cause even those with stamina to
think twice before attacking the constitutional basis of a school act.
Some sort of record for parties defendant was established in
McFarlane v. Hotz43 when twenty-four counties, twenty-seven
cities and villages, three forest preserve districts, ten park dis-
tricts, and miscellaneous other persons and municipal organiza-
tions were joined in a suit to test the validity of the Illinois
Municipal Retirement Fund Act.44  That act was upheld, how-
ever, despite the claim of violation of several sections of the
state constitution. The Hospital Authorities Act,45 on the other
hand, questioned in Grennan v. Sheldon,46 fell because the pro-
vision relating to the separate canvassing of votes in certain
territories outside the corporate limits of the municipality was
deemed to constitute an unreasonable classification. The unrea-
sonableness was said to exist in the fact that one class of voters
could defeat the establishment of the authority although it pos-
sessed no attributes or qualifications distinguishing it from others
not favored with that power.
Two amendments to the City Civil Service Act,47 adopted
in 1947, were rejected by the court in People ex rel. Duffy v.
Hurley48 for invalid attempted delegation of legislative power.
40 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. VIII, § 1.
41 Ibid., Art. II, § 2.
42 Ibid., Art. II, § 18.
43 401 Ill. 506, 82 N. E. (2d) 650 (1948).
44 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 24, § 1175 et seq.
45 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 23, § 163.1, et seq. A new statute was enacted in the
current period: Laws 1949, p. 361, S. B. 409; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 23,
§ 163.30 et seq.
46401 Ill. 351, 82 N. E. (2d) 162 (1948). See also People v. Spaid, 401 Ill. 534,
82 N. E. (2d) 435 (1948).
47 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 241, § 49. These sections had been given identical
numbering. A new section was enacted in 1949 to obviate the difficulty: Laws 1949,
p. 580, S. B. 357; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 24 2, § 49.
48 402 Ill. 562, 85 N. E. (2d) 26 (1949).
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The amendments provided for the granting of certain credit in
promotional examinations because of military service. It was not
made clear therein whether the credit was to be added before or
after the multiplication of the score by a weight factor. The in-
ability of the municipal employee to determine his promotional
rights with certainty was a primary factor in the outcome of the
case.
49
A warning has been sounded to any city or village which may
have neglected to set up a police pension fund through the me-
dium of the holding in Board of Trustees of Police Pension Fund
of Glen Ellyn v. Village of Glen Ellyn.50 The village concerned
was held liable to account for certain fees which it had collected
since 1932 and which should have been used to set up the pen-
sion fund but which fees had been used for other municipal pur-
poses. The duty to establish the fund was said to be a mandatory
one, operating instantly and automatically as soon as the village
population reached the required level,5 1 and, being a govern-
mental function, the failure to observe the duty could not affect
the village's liability for the theory of recovery was not predi-
cated on tort but rather on an idea resembling that of construc-
tive trust or unjust enrichment. Recovery of an amount for taxes
which should have been, but were not, levied for the fund was
denied on the ground that the failure to levy was simply an act
of negligence for which the law created no liability.
Interesting, if not significant, cases dealt with questions of
zoning. The opinion in County of Du Page v. Henderson,52 deal-
ing with a zoning ordinance enacted pursuant to the County Zon-
ing Act,5 3 traces developments in county zoning from the grand-
father of all zoning cases, that of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Com-
pany, 5 4 down to the present. In Metropolitan Insurance Coni-
pany v. City of Chicago,55 a zoning ordinance enacted in Chicago
49 The enactment of a new statute on the subject is noted at 47, ante.
50337 Il. App. 183, 85 N. E. (2d) 473 (1949).
51 Il. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 24, § 892 et seq.
52402 Il. 179, 83 N. E. (2d) 720 (1949).
53 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 34, § 152i et seq.
54 272 U. S. 365, 47 S. Ct. 114, 71 L. Ed. 303 (1926).
55 402 I1. 581, 84 N. E. (2d) 825 (1949).
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was held invalid, as it related to the plaintiff's property, because
of its arbitrary and unreasonable character. The case gives some
credence to the idea that one may, by reliance upon a zoning or-
dinance in effect when a purchase of property is made, gain the
right to object to a subsequent amendment thereof if the amend-
ment would deprive the owner of the contemplated use which
had dictated the purchase, provided that use was permissible un-
der the original zoning ordinance. Adoption of a zoning scheme
by a municipality would seem to carry elements of estoppel in its
train.
Two cases arose concerning tenure of teachers in public
schools. One section of the statute provides that a full-time
teacher, after a probationary period of two consecutive years of
service, is to be awarded a contract unless notice of dismissal has
been given sixty days prior to the end of the probationary period.56
In Betebenner v. Board of Education,57 the court said that all
service performed subsequent to the effective date of the statute
is deemed to be probationary, even though that term be not used
in the contract, but that one who has taught for two years is en-
titled to a contractual continued service status whether his em-
ployment during that period was or was not on a trial basis. In
Haag v. Board of Education, District No. 158,58 however, the court
held that the two-year period must consist of two consecutive
calendar years, so that service for two full school terms will be
insufficient to create the right to permanent tenure.
Some miscellaneous problems were handled in other cases.
It became necessary, in Smith v. Ballas,59 for example, for the
court to construe the statute which forbids the sale of liquor
within one hundred feet of a church, school or other specified
public building.60 Extended discussion over whether the one-hun-
dred foot measurement should be taken from the public building
56 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 122, § 24-2.
57 336 Il. App. 448, 84 N. E. (2d) 569 (1949).
58 337 I1. App. 201, 84 N. E. (2d) 833 (1949).
59335 Ill. App. 418, 82 N. E. (2d) 181 (1948), noted in 27 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REVIEW 180.
60 Il. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 43, § 127.
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or from the boundary of the premises would appear superfluous,
yet the court managed to put three pages of such discussion into
an opinion which held that distance from the premises was the
thing intended. Even at that the decision is laudable for its rela-
tive brevity in the face of the opinion in Woodward Governor
Company v. City of Loves Park6' wherein thirteen pages were
needed to establish that the holder of a railroad easement is an
"owner" entitled to petition for disconnection from a munici-
pality, 2 as one need not be the holder of a fee simple estate in
order to qualify as such. In direct contrast, an appellate court
sitting in another district, in one paragraph, disposed of the con-
tention that a city was to be deemed an "owner" under the same
section. 63 Although the city held an easement for highway pur-
poses over the property to be disconnected, it was said that the
city was a "taxeater" rather than a "taxpayer" so its easement
right in the property was insufficient to permit defeat of the
purposes for which the statute was enacted. The obligation to
pay taxes was, to that court, of significance in arriving at a con-
struction of the term "owner."
PUBLIC UTILITIES
The bulk of cases in the field of public utility law usually deal
with petitioners who question orders entered by the Illinois Com-
merce Commission. Half a dozen such matters were considered
by the Supreme Court during the past year but none set forth
new law and only two seem worthy of even brief mention. Through
the medium thereof, the court removed any lingering doubt that
the commission could grant a rehearing of an order after the
expiration of thirty days from the date of its entry. The two opin-
ions declare that such action is clearly improper. 64  Even the
61335 Ill. App. 528, 82 N. E. (2d) 387 (1948).
62 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 24, § 7-42.
63 See American Community Builders v. Chicago Heights, 337 Ill. App. 263, 85
N. E. (2d) 837 (1949). Leave to appeal denied.
64 Illini Coach Co. v. Greyhound Lines, 403 Ill. 21, 85 N. E. (2d) 39 (1949);
People ex rel. Ill. Highway Trans. Co. v. Biggs, 402 Ill. 401, 84 N. E. (2d) 372
(1949).
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legislature left the law unchanged except for the passage of an
act designed to establish an annuity and pension plan for em-
ployees of municipally-owned public utilities0 5 The plan pro-
posed thereby should now leave no uncovered public employees
in the state. 6
VIII. TORTS
Novelty in the field of tort law has been provided by both
cases and statutes.' In Mower v. Williams,2 for example, the lia-
bility of a highway maintenance man for negligence was consid-
ered. The defendant was charged with driving a snow plow into
an intersection and in the path of plaintiff's vehicle. The plain-
tiff was denied recovery when the court described the defendant's
duty to maintain the highway as one requiring the exercise of
discretion and judgment, calling it a "governmental" one as
distinguished from a ministerial duty. While "governmental"
may not be the proper term to use when speaking of the duty of
an individual, since it produces confusion with the immunity
granted to municipal organizations engaged in that type of func-
tion, it is clear that the court has established a precedent whereby
those charged with the maintenance of highways may escape lia-
bility for negligence because of the "judgment" required of them.
One might well inquire if any act can be more " Iministerial" than
that of driving a truck on a highway, even though a snow plow
be attached. The reason underlying a grant of immunity, to-wit:
the necessity for freedom of action, can scarcely be cited as suffi-
cient to allow a highway employee to ignore the obligation to use
due care while driving on the highway. The case of Liyihell v.
65 Laws 1949, p. 1222, H. B. 691; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 1112, § 153
et seq.
66 In Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 82 F. Supp. 368
(1949), the federal district court enjoined the state commission from attempting to
require the restoration of train service in the field of interstate commerce.
1The case of Gorczynski v. Nugent, 402 Ill. 147, 83 N. E. (2d) 495 (1949),
affirming 335 Ill. App. 63, 80 N. E. (2d) 418 (1948), dealing with the liability of a
race-track for injury to a minor stable boy, has been discussed above under the
heading of Labor Law. The case of Moore v. Moyle, 335 Ill. App. 342, 82 N. E. (2d)
61 (1948), is commented upon in the section dealing with Corporations, ante.
2402 Ill. 486, 84 N. E. (2d) 435 (1949), reversing 334 Ill. App. 16, 78 N. E. (2d)
529 (1948). Crampton, J., dissented.
